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Abstract
In this article we focus on carbon price dynamics, more specically the
impact of a policy envisaged by the European Commission to increase the
CO2 price. This policy consists of removing a share of the allowances al-
located for a period in order to reallocate some or all of them during the
following period. To analyze the impact of this backloading we determine
the CO2 market equilibrium with and without the policy, considering not
only the market for permits but also the output market of regulated sectors.
We propose a two-period model without uncertainty, where the market for
permits is perfectly competitive, and the output market can be either com-
petitive or oligopolistic. First, we dene the condition for which banking
from one period to another is optimal. This condition, that is the absence
of arbitrage opportunities (AOA), depends on not only from the per period
initial allocation but also on production market fundamentals. When this
condition is satised, the market for emission is shown intertemporally e¢-
cient. Second, we show that the back-loading policy may be such that the
AOA is no longer veried and thus create ine¢ciencies or being ine¤ective.
JEL Code: D4, Q58  Key words: CO2 prices, banking, backloading, ETS
reform.
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1 Introduction
The EUETS has undergone signicant changes since its inception in 2005. During
the rst phase (20052007) the permit price collapsed and reached zero during the
last months of 2007, when it became clear that too much allowances were issued
(see Figure 4 in Appendix 9.1). In response, the Climate and Energy Package,
adopted in December 2008, authorized the banking of permits between di¤erent
phases, ie the ability to use permits issued in one year (vintage) for compliance in
the years following. Banking was already authorized between di¤erent years inside
a phase and borrowing, i.e. the possibility to use permits issued for a specic year
for compliance in the preceding year, is allowed within a phase. Therefore, even
if a phase is long (total emissions lower than the sum of allowances), the value
of permits is positive because of the possibility to use them in the next phase.
That was the situation at the beginning of 2013: due to the European sovereign
crisis, the emission permit price on the EUETS had fallen to levels considered too
low to have an impact on investment decisions. In fact, the price did not reect
the value of using phase 2 allowances during phase 3, since 2012 emissions was
estimated below the cap for that year and there was a surplus of permits on the
market. This situation shows the importance of EUETS temporal exibilities
in order to understand how prices are formed, especially when those features are
being replicated in other markets currently being introduced around the world
(Australian, California, New Zealand but also China and South Korea). However,
the 2008 recession and the euro crisis beginning in 2010 have seen much lower
emissions than what was expected when emissions reductions targets were dened.
As a consequence, a permits surplus has grown in importance and is now expected
by the European Commission to reach 2000 Mt in 2013 (European Commission,
2012). The carbon price has fallen a lot and is now at levels deemed insu¢cient to
induce investments in cleaner production capacities. Along this, repeated e¤orts by
the Commission to dene targets for 2030 or beyond have backred under political
opposition by coal-dependent countries. The backloading proposal is a mean to
prop up the price that allows to get around this opposition. The ETS amendment
approved on July 3rd 2013 by the European Parliament states that 900 million of
permits will be withdrawn from auctions between 2013 and 2015, and reintroduced
in 2019 and 2020. During fall 2013, the amendment has moved to the European
Council to discuss several features, including how to connect backloading with
long-term objectives of the EUETS. As such, a backloading measure still implies
a high uncertainty on the nal quantity of permits e¤ectively supplied during the
last years of phase 3, since the possibility exists that withheld permits are not
completely re-injected in the market. This means that expected permits supply
would be lower than phase 3 cap. How do those features a¤ect the price dynamic
in the EUETS? In order to answer that question it is necessary to go beyond the
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analysis found in the literature and build a model in which the rules characterizing
its intertemporal exibilities are precisely handled. Moreover such measures, often
described as capacity adjustment mechanisms can be found in market designs of
emissions markets currently being set-up in di¤erent parts of the world (Australia,
California, South Korea, China to name the most advanced projects). The goal of
the present paper is to investigate how and when such an operation may succeed.
To do so, we consider rst the specicities of banking. This latter is allowed
inside a phase and between phases: a permit from a given vintage may be used for
all following compliances. This set-up also implies that borrowing is partly allowed
whithin a phase: since allowances for vintage t are issued before the compliance for
vintage t  1, it is possible to surrender them, in e¤ect allowing to borrow permits
in advance (for a presentation of these rules see Carmona, Fehr, Hinz (2009) or
Peluchon (2011)). The gradual evolution towards auctioning does not alter this
possibility as long as enough future vintages are sold in advance (phase 3 permits
have begun to be auctioned).1
Our work is related to papers studying temporal exibilities in permits mar-
kets. The rst articles to tackle this issue are Rubin (1996) and Cronshaw and
Kruse (1996). While the latter shows that banking leads to the least-cost solu-
tion, provided that no rm is subject to a rate of return regulation, the former
extends the model and provides a rigorous treatment allowing for the inclusion or
not of borrowing. Rubin nds the necessary conditions for a perfectly compet-
itive permits market equilibrium to exist, without uncertainty. The rms must
comply with a cap and each one must decide: (1) the level of their emissions at
each time, knowing that the less they emit, the more it costs (the cost function
may be di¤erent between rms); (2) the quantity of permits bought/sold at each
time. The equilibrium is found by means of optimal control in continuous time
and nite horizon, with a terminality condition such that if a rm holds a per-
mit at the terminal period, its value is zero. Banking and borrowing allow rms
to equalize their present value marginal abatement costs, and, as a consequence
the permit price grows at the discount rate (Hotellings rule). If borrowing is not
allowed and the constraint is binding, then the permit price will grow at a lower
rate, reecting the fact that a rm would need to borrow permits from the fu-
ture in order to equalize its present value marginal abatement costs. Rubin also
obtains the growth path of equilibrium emissions, which allows him to conclude
that banking allows for less social damages, when the cap decreases with time and
the damage function is convex and cumulative damage is the integral of damages
in all time periods. This helps to highlight the social benets coming with inter-
temporal exibility: rms have an incentive to reduce their emissions sooner than
1For a survey on banking literature, see Chevalier (2012), whereas a more general review of
the literature about cap and trade systems can be found in Taschini (2009).
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without banking, because they are saving their reduction in the form of permits
for a future more constrained. Kling and Rubin (1997) show that this property
does not necessarily imply that banking and borrowing are socially optimal, when
taking into account the fact that lower emissions mean higher production costs
for price-taking rms (the price of the good produced is exogenous, no demand is
represented in the model). They propose to modify the banking-borrowing provi-
sions in order to lower social costs by introducing a discount ratio for borrowed
permits (i.e. rms would have to pay more when they borrow).
Schennach (2000) treats equilibrium on the emission market in the same way
that Rubin (1996) but in innite horizon. Schennach shows that, when borrowing
is disallowed and when abatement marginal cost does not increase faster than
the discount rate the only incentive to bank allowances is the fact that there
are di¤erent phases with a decreasing cap. Banking allows rms to smooth the
evolution of those costs between the two phases by saving permits during the
rst phase and depleting that stock until a nite time in the second phase, after
which permit price only changes because of changes in costs. She provides explicit
solutions for the optimal emissions path and the permit price when borrowing is
not allowed by restricting abatement marginal cost to a linear function. Sensitivity
analysis can thus be performed when abatement cost decrease exogenously because
of the introduction of a new low-emissions fuel or of a new technology. This
framework is then extended to uncertainty. This latter case implies that a kind
of convenience yield exists: the expected permit price grows at a lower rate than
the discount rate, because of the borrowing constraint. Maeda (2004) explicitly
introduces a futures market with uncertainty and shows that prices depend of the
distribution between pure traders and regulated actors, when both are risk-averse
and the pure traders use permit futures to hedge an exogenous but correlated
risk. The question of market power in emissions permits market when there is
banking has been studied by Montero and Liski (2005) and a review of the di¤erent
connected questions can be found in the thorough review by Montero (2009). In all
preceding articles, the regulated market equilibrium is never introduced2. Baseline
emissions are always exogenous and the decisions are how much and when to abate
emissions. As such, it is di¢cult to analyze when and why Hotelings rule is not
valid, since it is almost always the case, as long as caps are decreasing and baseline
emissions at least non-decreasing. Moreover, the sensivity analysis performed by
Schennach cannot be thorough since marginal abatement costs variations have
to be interpreted either as baseline emissions shocks or technology shocks. Being
able to distinguish between causes a¤ecting the output market whose emissions are
regulated is important if we want to assess the impact of backloading measures
2Papers which focuses on both the permit market and the output market (see for exemple
Hintermann (2009)) do not take banking into account.
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described in the following paragraph.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in
section 2. In section 3, we show that the no intertemporel arbitrage opportunity
condition (equivalent to Hotellings rule) depends on the fundamentals of the out-
put market. Section 4 focuses on CO2 prices. When the no-arbitrage opportunity
condition is fullled, intertemporal e¢ciency is achieved on the emissions market,
since it implies that rms can minimize the sum of environmental discounted costs.
Moreover, we show that rules such a cap decreasing in a pre-determined percentage
every year can be ine¢cient as this rule might create ine¢ciencies in the market
for permits. In section 5, we discuss how backloading impact the permit market.
We dene a quota threshold such that below this threshold the backloading policy
has no e¤ect, and above this threshold e¢ciency is not guaranteed since present
value carbon prices are no longer equal. If only a share of permits backloaded is
re-injected in the market, then total cap is modied and prices are higher in both
cases.
2 The model
The model focuses on the determination of prices for emissions permits. To en-
hance the clarity of the analysis, we do not consider uncertainty. We consider two
periods, corresponding to two successive phases of a market for permits. The dis-
count rate between the two periods is r: For any variable or parameter y relating
to the rst period, y0 relates to the second one. In the following, we detail our
modelling assumptions.
Demand and production. There are n symmetric3 rms which compete
in quantities in a market for a homogeneous good. The demand for the produced
good is elastic. We use a linear inverse demand function p = b  dnq for the rst
period (p0 = b0   d0nq0 for the second period).
A rm chooses q in the rst period and q0 in the second period at a cost assumed
linear, for ease of calculation
C (q; q0) = cq +
1
1 + r
c0q0: (1)
Carbon Emissions and Abatement Technologies. When the rm pro-
duces q in the rst period (q0 in the second period) it emits an amount e (q) of
pollution in the rst period (e0 (q0) in the second period) such that e (q) = e0q
3The rms use the same polluting technology as well as the same abatement technology in
order to reduce their pollution.
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(e0 (q0) = e00q
0 respectively) where e0 > 0 and e
0
0 > 0 are exogenous factors asso-
ciated to the production technologies. For each period, each rm has the option
of reducing emissions (from e0 to  in the rst period and from e
0
0 to 
0 in the
second period) bearing an cost (e0   ) q in the rst period ((e
0
0   
0) q0 in the
second period). This cost is mainly related to the cost of fuel-switching which is
a short-term cost because production technologies are already in place. Producer
change production technology if this cost is lower than the gain obtained through
the use of cleaner technology.
Carbon Quotas and Emissions. Each period, a rm has to hold a permit
in order to pollute one unit. During each period the total volume of emissions is
limited by the initial allocation A in the rst period (A0 in the second period with
A0  A), whose amount is decided by the regulator. The emissions units can be
traded and sold in a market of emission permits in which rms are price-taker and
competition is perfect. A producer can buy at a price  per unit, z permits in the
rst period (z0 permits at a price 0 per unit in the second period). For each period,
he must have at least as many permits as units that emits. In the rst period, he
can store permits, z, in order to use it in the second period (banking). Permits
are stored at zero costs. We assume that borrowing is impossible, therefore z  0;
and that all inventories have to be emptied by the end of the second period.4
Firms prots. Firms prots can be decomposed into three terms:
 net revenues from selling in the output market, (p  c  ) q+ 1
1+r
(p0  c0 
00)q0,
 cost of emissions after abatement,   (e0   ) q  
1
1+r
(e00   
0) q0  0 and
 net revenues from banking (trading) on the CO2 permits (market), (
0
1+r
 )z.
Notice that the sign of the last term depends on the value of the demand and
cost parameters and on the CO2 quota. In particular, quotas from the rst period
may not be enough to allow banking. In this case 
0
1+r
> . In the following,
we determine conditions on A and A0 such as in equilibrium there is no arbitrage
opportunity
 
0
1+r
= 

:
4For similar setting where rms in the output market can be competitive (if n tends to innity
and the demand is inelastic) or oligopolisitc and no market power exists in the allowance market,
see Requate (2005).
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Banking. Banking is a trading tool allowing to earn prots from the price
spread in the two phases of the market for permits. This is similar to physical
storage that smooths the seasonal price di¤erential. Banking helps suppliers to
meet their obligation5 (have as many permits as emissions) at a lower cost.
3 Solving the model
Equilibrium conditions on the CO2 market. Given the assumptions
above, the equilibrium conditions on the CO2 market are as follows
z = q + z; (2)
z0 = 0q0   z; (3)
nz  A; (4)
nz0  A0: (5)
Equations (2) and (3) represent the fundamental relationship between banking in
the market for permits and the output market.
Equilibrium prices of emission permits and supply. To determine the
equilibrium price in the market for CO2 permits, in a rst step, we determine the
market equilibrium of the good considering permit prices ( and 0) exogenous,
then in second step, we calculate the equilibrium on the CO2 market.
Firms maximize their prot given by
 = (p  c  ) q +
1
1 + r
(p0   c0   00) q0
  (e0   ) q  
1
1 + r
(e00   
0) q0 +

0
1 + r
  

z: (6)
We solve the model as follow. We nd the symmetric Nash equilibrium on
the nal market the quantities produced by a rm and get the total quantities
5Since traders do not have this obligation, emission permits are more valuable for a supplier
than for a trader. As a consequence, traders can be active only if some suppliers are nancially
constrained. Since the environment is certain, if producers are not nancially constrained so
pure traders do not exist (the producers have the highest willingness to pay). If during the rst
period the producers do not have the nancial capacity to store permits then the traders can act
as a portfolio manager of permits if producers have the nancial capacity to buy them during the
second period. In this case, (with a discount rate equal for each type of agent) the equilibrium
obtained is identical to that obtained without nancing constraints. The pure traders act as an
intermediary (on a market that is considered competitive).
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produced in the two periods
q =
b  c    (e0   )
(1 + n) d
; (7)
q0 =
b0   c0   00   (e00   
0)
(1 + n) d0
: (8)
The equilibrium on the CO2 market implies (4), (5) and
@
@z
=
0
1 + r
   = 0 if z > 0: (AOA)
For ease of calculations, in the following Sections, we assume c0 = c; b0 = b ,
d0 = d and  = 0 = e0 = e
0
0 (see the Appendix 9.3 for the general case).
4 Equilibrium.
If the number of permits A+ A0 is such as
A+ A0 <
n
n+ 1
2(b  c)
d
(9)
then the rms are constrained. If furthermore
(1 + r)A  A0 >
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
d
(10)
there is an opportunity to store permits and at equilibrium the abscence of arbit-
rage opportunities, AOA is characterized by 0 = (1 + r)  and equilibrium is
dened by
q =
A+ A0
n (2 + r) 
+
r(b  c)
(n+ 1) (2 + r) d
; (11)
q0 = (1 + r)
(A+ A0)
n (2 + r) 
 
r(b  c)
(n+ 1) (2 + r) d
; (12)
z =
(1 + r)A  A0
n (2 + r)
 
r(b  c)
(n+ 1) (2 + r) d
; (13)
 =
2(b  c)
(2 + r) 
 
(n+ 1) (A+ A0) d
n (2 + r) 2
; (14)
0 = (1 + r) : (AOA)
The condition on A and A0 such that rms are constrained by the number of
permits on the two periods combined (Equation (9)) and the optimality condition
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of the banking (Equation (10)) imply rms are quota constrained in period 1;
i.e.
A <
n
n+ 1
(b  c) 
d
: (15)
Since by assumption A0 < A; Equation (15) implies rms are quota constrained
in period 2; i.e.
A0 <
n
n+ 1
(b  c) 
d
: (16)
If there is no banking, rms are quota constrained during the second period if
Inequality (16) is veried and during the rst period if Inequality (15) is veried.6
Proposition 1.  No-arbitage condition  If the optimality condition of the
banking (Equation (10)) does not hold then the equation of AOA is not veried.
In this case, banking is not the optimal and since by assumption borrowing is
impossible, carbon prices are such that 0 < (1 + r)  and the equilibrium is dened
by
qnb =
A
n
; (17)
q0nb =
A0
n
; (18)
nb =
b  c

 
1 + n
n
dA
2
; (19)
0nb =
b  c

 
(1 + n)
n
dA0
2
: (20)
No banking. Equations (17)  (20) dene also equilibrium in the case where the
banking is not allowed and the rms are quota constrained in period 1 (Equation
(15) veried). In this case, we have 0nb > nb. Indeed,
0nb = nb +
(A  A0) (1 + n) d
n2
> nb: (21)
The di¤erence between the prices of permits (0nb   nb) is an increasing function
of the elasticity of the demand. In competition on the market of the good (n tends
to innity) the prices of permits are nb =
(b c)

  Ad
2
and 0nb =
(b c)

  A
0d
2
: These
prices are increasing functions of the number of rms. Indeed, when this number
is higher, the quantity produced becomes more important and consequently the
volume of emissions is increasing therefore the need for permits is more important.
6Inegality (15) implies  > 1; or e0q > q + (e0   ) q that is a rm will adopt the new
technology including adoption costs. Said di¤erently, allocations A and A0 give incentives to
adopt the technology with the abatment factor .
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If the number of permits is su¢ciently low (A < n
2(n+1)
(b c)
d
, A0 < n
2(n+1)
(b c)
d
), the
prices of permits decrease with the polluting factor  and when n
2(n+1)
(b c)
d
< A <
n
(n+1)
(b c)
d
and n
2(n+1)
(b c)
d
< A0 < n
(n+1)
(b c)
d
the prices of permits increase with .
If the rms are constrained only on the second period and the banking is not
allowed, the quantity produced by each rm in the rst period is
q =
b  c
(1 + n) d
; (22)
the CO2 permit price in the rst period is  = 0; the CO2 permit price in the
second period is dened by the Equation (20) and the resulting outputs sold by
each rm on the second period by the Equation (18).
No constraint. If the rms are not constrained by the permits allocation, the
quantities produced by each rm are
q = q0 =
b  c
(1 + n) d
(23)
and the CO2 permit prices are
 = 0 = 0: (24)
Equilibrium properties. Equation (13) shows that banking decreases with a
factor that depends from the parameter or demand and costs of the output market
( r(b c)
(n+1)(2+r)d
> 0). Indeed, production of goods o¤ers exibility and weakens the
borrowing constraint. Combining Equations (11) and (12) yields
q0 = (1 + r)q  
r (b  c)
(1 + n) d
: (25)
Consequently q0 < (1 + r)q: Since banking links the productions of the two
periods, if the parameters of demand and costs are the same from one period
to another, while the production of the second period will be at best equal to
the capitalized production of the rst period. Moreover, given that we are in
the case where rms are constrained by the number of permits, the total output
(n (q0 + q)) depends only on the number of permits (A+A0) and emission factor
. Indeed, the Equations (11) and (12) provide
q0 + q =
A+ A0
n
: (26)
When n tends to innity (competitive markets) then q0 tends to (1 + r)q:
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Remark 1. The equilibrium quantities with (Equations (11)  (12)) and without
banking (Equations (17)  (18)) and the optimality condition of the banking (Equa-
tion (10)) provide
(1 + r) q + q0 < (1 + r) qnb + q
0
nb: (27)
Equation (27) does not mean that there is strategic restriction of the output.
Obviously, the prot of a rm obtained when there is banking,  is greater
than the prot without banking, nb: The ability to store permits o¤er exibility
to the rm. This exibility has a value that can be quantied. Indeed,
 = nb + P (28)
where
P =
((1 + r)A  A0)
n2 (1 + r) (2 + r) 2
[(1 + n) ((1 + r)A  A0) d  n (b  c) r] : (29)
The terms in brackets are those of the optimality condition of the banking (Equa-
tion (10)). As a result, if the banking is optimal Equation (10) is satised then
the expression in brackets in Equation (29) is positive and therefore P is positive.
P is the value of the exibility obtained with the banking. This value tends to 0
when n tends to innity. It is equal to zero when A0 = (1 + r)A:
In the appendix (see 9.2) the impact of banking on the mark-up is studied.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium quantity q dened by the Equation (11) (respectively
q0 dened by the Equation (12)) is increasing (respectively decreasing) in the dis-
count rate, r:
Proof. @q

@r
= 2(b c)
(n+1)(2+r)2d
  A+A
0
n(2+r)2
: Since by assumption Equation (9) holds then
A+ A0 < n
n+1
2(b c)
d
, @q

@r
> 0: Furthermore @q
0
@r
=  @q

@r
:
5 Analysis of CO2 prices.
5.1 Initial allocations and banking
Let us dene  = A
0
A
: In Figure 1, excluding the area where  > 1 (since by
assumption A0 < A) three zones are represented.
1. The amount of permits allocated are such that banking is not optimal, ie.
AOA is not veried. This is achieved when A and  are located in the shaded
region. This case occurs when A is su¢ciently small.
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2. If A > n
n+1
(b c)
d
for all  the banking is optimal ie. AOA is veried.
3. If A > n
n+1
2(b c)
d
for all  rms will never be constrained in emission and
hence  = 0 = 0:
Lemma 3. The domain of A and A0 such as there are AOA is decreasing in r.
By contrast, the discount rate has no impact on the elds of A and A0 for which
rms are "quota constrained".
Proof.
@[(1+r)A  n
n+1
(b c)r
d
]
@r
= A   n
1+n
(b c)
d
: Then
@[(1+r)A  n
n+1
(b c)r
d
]
@r
< 0 if A <
n
1+n
(b c)
d
: Since by assumption A0 < A; (9) yields A < n
1+n
(b c)r
d
< n
1+n
(b c)
d
: In
opposition n
n+1
2(b c)
d
 A0 is independent of r. So an increase in the discount rate
leads to a decrease of areas A and A0 where the AOA is veried.
Insert gure1.gif
Figure 1: AOA vs no AOA zones.
5.2 CO2 prices.
To each region plotted in Figure 1 above, correspond CO2 prices we have plotted
in Figure 2, more precisely we drew  and 0
1+r
as a function of A, the number of
permits allocated in the rst period. Let
a =
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
d (1 + r   )
(30)
and
a =
n
n+ 1
2 (b  c) 
d (1 + )
: (31)
1. When A is less than a the banking is not optimal and the CO2 prices are
dened by the Equation (19) and Equation (20),  > 0
1+r
:
2. If A is greater than a, then the permit price in the second period is equal to
the capitalized permit price of the rst period,  = 0
1+r
and, if A is greater
than a the rms are not constrained by emissions and consequently permit
prices are zero.
Insert gure2.ppt
Figure 2: CO2 prices as a function of A:
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If A0 increases (ceteris paribus), the price of CO2 decreases (increases  and
hence a and a decrease). A decrease in the cost of production increases production
thus emissions are increased and consequently permit prices are increased. There
is the same e¤ect when the elasticity increases7. If A 2 [a; a] ; the permit price in
a competitive market is  = 2(b c)d
(2+r)
 
(A+A0)d
(2+r)2
.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium price of permits for the rst period,  (respectively
second, 0) is decreasing in r (respectively increasing).
Proof. @

@r
=   2(b c)
(2+r)2
  1+n
n
(A+A0)
(2+r)22
: Since by assumption Equation (9) holds then
A+ A0 < n
n+1
2(b c)
d
, @

@r
< 0: Furthermore @
0
@r
=  @

@r
:
6 E¤ect of set aside or backloading of emis-
sion certicates.
The backloading policy is meant to be implemented only in EU-ETS second phase.
This means that the two periods considered in the model must be thought as two
group of years included in the same phase.8 Two congurations must be studied.
1. A pure backloading case, where the quantity of permits withheld in the
rst period is equal to the quantity of permits supplied in the second period,
and
2. A partial backloading case, where the quantity supplied in the second
period is lower, reecting the lower expected supply because of uncertainty
on the policy (as explained in the description of backloading measures).
6.1 Pure backloading case.
If a portion  of the permits allocated in the rst period are removed to be
redistributed to the second period, the condition on A and A such that rms are
constrained by the number of permits on the two periods combined (Equation
(9)) is not changed, but the optimality condition of the banking (Equation (10))
becomes(1 + r) (A )  (A0 +)  n
n+1
(b c)r
d
()
(1 + r)A  A0 
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
d
+ (2 + r): (32)
7That is to say, when 1
d
increases.
8The fact that borrowing is partially allowed does not modify the conclusions from the model,
since the quantities supplied in advance are completely equivalent to a higher cap in the given
period.
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Setting aside permits has no impact on the tightness of the constraint but may
increase the area where the banking is not optimal.
A policy that may have no e¤ect. If the quantity of permits withheld in the
rst period is too small then backloading has no impact on CO2 prices. Indeed, if
initially the optimality condition of the banking (Equation (10)) is veried, for all
set aside    where
 =

max
(1 + r)A  A0
2 + r
 
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
(2 + r) d
; 0

; (33)
rm still bank permits in the rst period in order to use them during the second
period. The threshold is equal to the amount of permits that would be e¢ciently
banked in the absence of any set aside.
Figure 3.a presents the impact of a set aside1 such as1 < : Thus, when the
constraint of the rst period is tightened (A is reduced by 1) and the constraint
of second period is released by 1 then there is a translation to the right of a
(which becomes a1) as well as a translation towards the left of a (which becomes
a1). The equilibrium is unchanged (1 = 
 and 01 = 
0):
Insert gure 3.a.ppt
Figure 3.a: Impact of backloading on CO2 prices where  = 1 < 
A policy that creates ine¢ciencies. If the quantity of permits withheld in
the rst period is higher, AOA can not be veried and thus the policy may create
ine¢ciencies. Indeed, if  >  banking is no longer optimal. For exemple, in
Figure 3.b,  = 2 > : In this case a and a respectively become a2 and a2and
the new equilibrium is 2 > 
 and 02 > 
0:
Insert gure 3.b.ppt
Figure 3.b: Impact of backloading on CO2 prices where  = 2 > 
Therefore, a policy of pure backloading has either no e¤ect on CO2 prices or
increases them such as the AOA does not longer hold. Is a partial backloading
policy would increase the CO2 price in the rst period?
6.2 Partial backloading case.
If backloading is such that the number of additional permit redistributed in the
second period is equal to  then the optimality condition of the banking (Equa-
tion (32)) can be rewritten
(1 + r)A  A0 
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
d
+ (1 +  + r) (34)
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which gives the threshold:
 = max

(1 + r)A  A0
1 +  + r
 
n
n+ 1
(b  c) r
(1 +  + r) d
; 0

: (35)
If the number of permits withdrawn the rst period is less than  the partial
backloading policy has no e¤ect. In contrast, if this number is greater than 
it creates ine¢ciencies.
If a portion of the permits allocated in the rst period is removed to be re-
injected in whole or in part in the second period, the area (A;A0) such that it
is optimal to store permits between the two periods is widened. It is possible
that the decrease of permits allocated in the rst period is so high that banking
permits between the two periods is no longer optimal. In the pure backloading
case, the permit prices are not modied, provided that the quantity withheld is
lower than a given threshold. Otherwise, the borrowing constraint becomes act-
ive and Hotellings rule does not apply anymore. Present value permit price in
the second phase is lower than the price in rst phase. This situation is unlikely
when the number of permits injected the second period is less than the number of
permits withdrawn the rst period (that is to say  < 1). In the partial backload-
ing case, prices rise, provided that the quantity withheld is lower than another
threshold, given that the total of allowances supplied is modied in comparison
with the pure backloading case. This means that backloading may succeed
in propping-up prices, due to expectations.9
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the joint equilibrium of an emissions permits market and
the output market whose emissions are capped. Banking allows rms to minimize
their compliance costs as long as it is optimal to bank. We provide the conditions
for which this is true, implying that the permit price follows Hotellings rule. Those
conditions depend on the values of demand, cost, emission and allocations para-
meters. When the conditions are not fullled, the present value of second period
permit price is lower than rst period price and no permits are banked. Our model
thus allows to understand how backloading proposals are supposed to work on the
EU-ETS, and under which conditions they may distort the intertemporal e¢ciency
9When the parameters of the output market take di¤erent values at each period (see Appendix
9.3) and banking is not optimal, the rst period permit price may be higher than the present
value of the second period price, even though the cap is decreasing. Such a case is possible if, for
example, on the product market, demand in the second period is lower than the one in the rst,
or if expected second period emission rate is lower than in the rst period. This last example may
happen if for instance a strong development of renewables is expected between the two periods.
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of the market. Our model provides elements on how to make those adjustments
taking into account structural of the fundamentals in the output market of rms
under environmental constraints.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Evolution of CO2 price
Insert Figure4.gif
Figure 4: Prix spot EUA in e/t (Source - Point Carbon )
9.2 E¤ect of banking on mark-up rate.
Without banking, the mark-up rate of the rst period is given by
m =
p  c  nb
c+ nb
=
dA
nb  (1 + n) dA
; (36)
and the mark-up rate of the second period
m0 =
p0   c  0nb
c+ 0nb
=
dA0
nb  (1 + n) dA0
: (37)
These rates are increasing functions of the number of permits and decreasing func-
tions of n and of the emission factor :With banking, the mark-up rate of the rst
period is given by
m =
nr (b  c) + (1 + n) d (A+ A0)
(1 + n) [n (2b+ cr)   (1 + n) d (A+ A0)]
(38)
and the mark-up rate of the second period is equal to
m
0
 =
nr (b  c)   (1 + n) d (A+ A0)
(1 + n) [n (cr   2 (1 + r) b) + (1 + n) (1 + r) d (A+ A0)]
: (39)
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These rates are decreasing functions of the number of permits and tend obviously
to 0 as n tends to innity. Combining Equations (36) and (38) yield m > m
if Equation (10) is veried. As a result, store permits in the rst period reduces
the mark-up of the rst period. What is the e¤ect of storage on the mark-up of
the second period? Combining Equations (37) and (39) yields m0 < m0 if A > S
where
S =
n2
n+ 1
b (b  c) r2
d ((1 + n) drA0 + bn)
+
A0 (n (1 + r) b  A0 (1 + n) dr)
(1 + n) drA0 + bn
:
We show that if A < n
1+n
b
d
(true from (15)) then (10) implies A > S: Therefore,
store permits in the rst period increases the mark-up of the second period.
9.3 General case
We consider the case in which c0 6= c; b0 6= b , d0 6= d and e0 6= e
0
0: If the number of
permits A+ A0 is such as
A+ A0 6
n
n+ 1

(b  c) d0+ (b0   c0) d0
dd0
 
d0 (e0   ) + d (e
0
0   
0) 0
dd0

(40)
then the rms are constrained. If furthermore
(1 + r) d02A  d02A0 >
n
n+ 1
[(1 + r) (b  c  e0) 
0   (b0   c0   e00) + r
0] 0
(41)
there is an opportunity to store permits and at equilibrium the abscence of ar-
bitrage opportunities, AOA is characterized by (AOA) and equilibrium is dened
by
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 =
(b  c) d0+ (b0   c0) d0
d02 + d (1 + r) 02
 
n+ 1
n
(A+ A0) dd0
d02 + d (1 + r) 02
 
d0 (e0   ) + d (e
0
0   
0) 0
d02 + d (1 + r) 02
; (42)
0 = (1 + r) ; (AOA)
z =
(1 + r) d02A  d02A0
n (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
+
[(b0   c0)   (1 + r) (b  c) 0] 0
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
+
[(1 + r) e0
0   (r0 + e00) ] 
0
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
(43)
q =
d0 (A+ A0) 
n (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
 
[(b0   c0)   (1 + r) (b  c) 0] 0
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
 
[(1 + r) e0
0   (r0 + e00) ] 
0
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
; (44)
q0 =
d (1 + r) (A+ A0) 0
n (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
+
[(b0   c0)   (1 + r) (b  c) 0] 
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
+
[(1 + r) e0
0   (r0 + e00) ] 
(n+ 1) (d02 + d (1 + r) 02)
(45)
If the condition (41) does not hold then the equation of AOA is not veried and
the equilibrium is dened by
nb =
b  c

 
(1 + n)
n
dA
2
 
e0   

; (46)
0nb =
b0   c0
0
 
(1 + n)
n
dA0
02
 
e00   
0
0
; (47)
qnb =
A
n
; (48)
q0nb =
A0
n0
: (49)
Notice that the mark-up rates are the same as in the case without abatement
cost.The area of AOA is larger when there are abatement costs. The possibility to
switch technology bearing abatement costs in order to emit less emission provides
exibility to the rm. As a result, permit prices after switching technologies are
weaker than before and the area where prices of CO2 permits are zero is wider.
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Figure 1: AOA vs no AOA zones.
Figure 2: CO2 prices as a function of A:
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Figure 3.a: Impact of backloading on CO2 prices where  = 1 < 
Figure 3.b: Impact of backloading on CO2 prices where 
= 2 > 
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